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Creation of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) made Japan’s economic and fiscal 
policy making more transparent, consistent and coherent.  This new institutional arrangement 
accelerated structural reform and improved economic and fiscal policy making in general, thus 
contributing to the recent economic recovery.  Success of this new institutional arrangement is, at 
least in part, attributable toa couple of virtues of CEFP’s decision making process:  transparency, an 
economy-wide view and an integrated approach.  However, the CEFP is a new institutional setting 
and not deeply rooted in Japanese political system.  In post-Koizumi era, further efforts should be 
made to make more use of the CEFP as a tool to improve policy making and an engine of economic 
reform.   3
(Acceleration of structural reform in the recent past) 
Under the Koizumi administration, which started in April 2001, a non-Keynesian economic policy 
stance has been taken and structural reform such as financial sector reform and regulatory reform has 
been accelerated, and thus contributing to a recent improvement in economic conditions in Japan. 
 
Particularly important achievement in the last five years includes the following: 
(a) The non-performing loan problem has been resolved and the financial system has been stabilized. 
(b) Deregulation in financial, energy, telecommunication and other sectors has been accelerated. 
(c) Privatization of Japan Post, the biggest financial institution in the world, has been decided. 
 
The economy bottomed out in January 2002 and has been recovering since then.  The substantial 
improvement in Japanese economic conditions is thought, by a majority of economists, to be 
attributable to progress in structural reform as well as to restructuring efforts by the private sector.  
 
(Economic impact of regulatory reform) 
Although it is not easy to quantify impact of structural reform on economic growth or welfare, in the 
case of regulatory reform, for instance, its cumulative consumer benefits since the beginning of the 
1990s was estimated by the Cabinet Office at 14.3 trillion yen (approximately 3% of GDP) in total 
and 112 thousand yen per capita in FY 2002.  Particularly large benefits were brought about by 
regulatory reform in the areas of trucking, electric power, petroleum products and mobile 
telecommunication. 
 
Incidentally, regulatory reform issues have been primarily discussed and promoted by the Council for 
Promotion of Regulatory Reform, an advisory body to the Prime Minister.  However, important 
regulatory reform issues have also been discussed and promoted by the Council on Economic and 
Fiscal Policy. 
 
(Factors behind acceleration of structural reform) 
Acceleration of structural reform and improvement in economic policy making in general are partly 
due to strong personal commitment of Prime Minister Koizumi to structural reform and enthusiasm of 
the Ministers of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy under Koizumi administration, but a more 
fundamental institutional change was creation of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) 
in January 2001.  Since the foundation of the CEFP, the decision making process of the government 
regarding economic and fiscal policies has been improved and those policies have been made more 
consistent and coherent. 
   4
(What is the CEFP) 
In January 2001, a major reorganization of the central government was carried out.  The main 
purpose of the reorganization was to strengthen the Prime Minister’s initiative and leadership in 
policy making, and the centerpiece of the reorganization was introduction of the Council on 
Economic and Fiscal Policy.  As a chairperson of the CEFP, the Prime Minister can now set an 
agenda and play an influential role in economic and fiscal policy making. 
 
The CEFP makes deliberation on all important matters that relate to economic and fiscal policy.  A 
wide variety of microeconomic, macroeconomic and fiscal issues have been discussed in the CEFP, 
including resolution of non-performing loans, acceleration of regulatory reform in various areas, 
expenditure and tax system reform.  Decisions made by the CEFP become basic government policies 
through authorization by Cabinet Decisions, which should be reflected in policies and initiatives of 
relevant ministries.  
 
The CEFP meetings are held at least once a month, and approximately 200 meetings were held in the 
last five years. 
 
(Membership of the CEFP) 




Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy 
Minister of Internal Affairs and Communication 
Minister of Finance 
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry 
Governor of the Bank of Japan 
Fujio Mitarai, Chairman and CEO, Canon Inc. 
Uichiro Niwa, Chairman of ITOCHU Corporation 
Takatoshi Ito, Professor, University of Tokyo 
Naohiro Yashiro, Professor, International Christian University 
 
The Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal 
Policy are permanent members of the CEFP.  The last four members
2 from the private sector were 
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appointed by the Prime Minister, and their term is two-year but renewable without limit.  Private 
sector members should account for at least 40 percent of all CEFP members excluding the Prime 
Minister. 
 
It is also noted that other ministers than CEFP member ministers may be invited to attend a CEFP 
meeting as extraordinary (special) members, depending on an agenda of a particular meeting.  For 
example, when pension reform is discussed, the Minister of Welfare and Labour may be asked to 
participate in that particular meeting. 
 
(Role of the Cabinet Office) 
The CEFP is an organization set up in the Cabinet Office and three Directors General of the Cabinet 
Office serve as the secretariat of the CEFP.  So it seems useful to briefly explain the role of the 
Cabinet Office at this stage. 
 
The Cabinet Office was established in January 2001 as a part of the major reorganization of central 
government.  This new agency assists the Cabinet in its overall strategic functions.  While the 
individual line ministries are in charge of specific areas of public administration, the Cabinet Office 
carries out such tasks as planning and overall coordination from its position an echelon (one rank) 
above other ministries.  The Cabinet Office directly supports the Prime Minister in the exercise of 
his leadership and assists in the policymaking process by conducting planning and overall 
coordination of key policies.  Those policies range over several areas:  economic and fiscal 
management, science and technology, gender equality, natural disaster management and so on. 
 
The head of the Cabinet Office is the Prime Minister, and its top management also includes the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary and the Ministers of State for Special Missions, including the Minister of State for 
Economic and Fiscal Policy.  The Office consists of a Ministers’ Secretariat, seven Directors 
General for specific fields and four Bureaus. 
 
(Virtues of the CEFP) 
The success of the CEFP in promoting structural reform and improving economic and fiscal policy 
making in general is, at least in part, attributable to a couple of virtues of decision making process of 
the CEFP:  transparency, an economy-wide view and an integrated approach. 
 
(Transparency) 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Ushio (Chairman and CEO of Ushio Inc.), Hiroshi Okuda (Chairman of Toyota Motor Corp.), 
Masahiko Homma (Professor, Osaka University), Hiroshi Yoshikawa (Professor, University of 
Tokyo).   6
Before the CEFP was established, important economic and fiscal policies were often decided behind 
closed doors by bureaucrats of the ministry in charge and interested members of ruling party.  But 
now the Minister in charge has to discuss an issue with CEFP members including the Prime Minister 
and convince them before he or she goes ahead with his or her proposal, once it is taken up by the 
CEFP.  Furthermore, all discussion at the CEFP is made public, with a very few exception.  The 
CEFP makes a summary of minutes, including speakers’ names, public within three days after the 
meeting and complete minutes within four years.  It is also noted that a summary of minutes is fairly 
detailed.  This procedure makes decision making process by the CEFP open and transparent. 
 
This openness and transparency tend to make a final conclusion of policy discussion at the CEFP less 
prone to be affected by vested interests.  First, it is difficult for vested interest groups to push their 
self-interest too much.  Secondly, public opinion sometimes plays an important role in the decision 
making process at the CEFP.  Since discussion at the CEFP is often carried by the press, the general 
public responds to the news in one way or the other, which may have an impact on a final conclusion.  
Most often, the public opinion is against vested interests. 
 
This open and transparent decision making process at the CEFP is in sharp contrast with old days.  
Traditionally any important policy proposals needed to be approved by the ruling party (the Liberal 
Democratic Party) before they were formally approved by the government.  So it was bureaucrats in 
charge of an individual policy matter and interested LDP members in that matter who made final 
decisions.  It was not clear at all for the general public how policy conclusions were reached.  The 
decision making process was closed and not transparent.  It is still true that an approval by the LDP 
is needed for any important policy proposals, but this process is not as binding as before due to a 
strengthened leadership of the Prime Minister, who is the President of the LDP as well. 
 
The Prime Minister’s leadership in economic policy making was strengthened by the introduction of 
the CEFP itself.  Since the Prime Minister chairs the CEFP, he or she can set an agenda and play an 
influential role in economic policy making.  Also it is often argued that the Prime Minister’s 
leadership was strengthened and power of LDP fractions weakened by the introduction of the 
single-member constituency system in the Lower House in 1994. 
 
(Economy-wide view) 
Another strength of the CEFP as an economic policy institution is that most of its members have an 
economy-wide view and a broad perspective, and therefore it tends to attach more importance to net 
gains to the economy as a whole from any policy initiative than narrow sectional interests.  Again, 
this is in sharp contrast with old days.  It was bureaucrats in charge and interested ruling party   7
members who decide upon major economic policies, and they were more interested in net gains to a 
particular sector rather than to a national economy as a whole. 
 
Two CEFP members are from the business sector and the other two from academics.  The latter two 
members are free from any particular interest groups and can make unbiased decisions with an 
economy-wide perspective.  Two members from the business sector may have vested interests in 
particular industries or companies they represent, but in reality such interests do not seem to have 
played an important role in policy-making process at the CEFP.  This is probably due to the 
following two reasons.  First, minutes of the CEFP will be made public.  So, if they favored 
particular industries or companies they represent too much, their dignity would be impaired.  
Secondly, the current members from the business sector are both well-respected businessmen who 
represent Japanese industry as a whole, although they are both involved in top management of 
particular corporations. 
 
Most of the CEFP member ministers have a horizontal responsibility rather than a sector-specific 
responsibility.  Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy is primarily concerned with 
macroeconomic development in the short-run as well as in the medium- and long-run.  Minister of 
Finance is responsible for public finance, particularly for that of national government.  Minister of 
Internal Affairs and Communication is, among others, responsible for public finance of local 
governments.  Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is interested, among others, in improving 
international competitiveness of Japanese industries.  Needless to say, Governor of the Bank of 
Japan, who is responsible for the conduct of monetary policy, has a very broad perspective.  Minister 
of Internal Affairs and Communication and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry are in part line 
ministers.  But, all in all, the members of the CEFP from the government side are from horizontal 
ministries and have an economy-wide view. 
 
Deliberation at the CEFP is supported by three Directors General of the Cabinet Office acting as the 
secretariat of the CEFP.  The secretariat represented by three Directors General does not have any 
link to vested interest groups and is of horizontal character.  This also contributes to neutrality and 
an economy-wide perspective of the CEFP.  However, more than half of the staff members of the 
secretariat are seconded from other ministries, and this sometimes creates difficulties in supporting 
deliberation and maintaining neutrality at the CEFP. 
 
(Integrated approach:  Economic growth and fiscal consolidation) 
In the past, the Economic Planning Agency (EPA; currently the most important part of the Cabinet 
Office) was primarily interested in economic growth and macroeconomic development, whereas the   8
Ministry of Finance was basically concerned with fiscal consolidation.  However, there was no 
effective coordination mechanism between these two interests.  The EPA was supposed to 
coordinate economic and fiscal policies, but in reality it was not powerful enough to have the say in 
those policy matters.  Now that the CEFP is created, both economic and fiscal implications of any 
policy measures are examined in an integrated, coherent and consistent manner at the CEFP, with 
both the Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policies (a Cabinet Office Minister) and the 
Minister of Finance present, and final decisions are made by the Prime Minister if a unanimous 
agreement is not reached. 
 
In particular, fiscal policy, both expenditure and revenue sides, was exclusively handled and decided 
upon by the Ministry of Finance in the past.  But under the current institutional arrangement, the 
CEFP decides upon a basic design of an annual budget, and the Ministry of Finance is responsible for 
formulating annual budget based on that basic design.  This new arrangement guarantees that 
economic implication of fiscal measures are taken account of, since most of the CEFP members have 
an economy-wide view and a strong interest in economic implications of those measures. 
 
(Special role played by the members from the private sector) 
Four members from the private sector have played a very important role in economic policy making 
at the CEFP.  As was mentioned earlier, important policy decisions were mostly made by 
bureaucrats in charge and interested members of ruling parties.  The private sector members are 
neither bureaucrats nor members of ruling party, and they can make policy recommendations free 
from any vested interests.  In particular, a variety of policy recommendations have been made by 
two members from the business sector based on their cost-conscious management expertise.  Two 
members from academics have made various proposals based on objective economic analyses. 
 
(Case of pension reform – An illustration) 
Take a recent pension reform case as an example of how the CEFP contributed to reach a more 
balanced policy conclusion from an economy-wide perspective.  This reform agenda was discussed 
at the CEFP in 2003.  Because of rapidly ageing population and declining birth rates, sustainability 
of public pension system was questioned and reform plans were discussed at the CEFP.  The 
Ministry of Welfare and Labour, which is in charge of public pension system, tended to favor a 
combination of relatively high pension benefits and relatively high premium, while four 
private-sector members of the CEFP were in favor of relatively low benefits and premium, taking into 
account an adverse impact of high premium on economic activities.  The Ministry of Welfare and 
Labour did not pay much attention to the impact of pension reform on economic activities, while the 
other camp had a wider perspective or an economy-wide view.  One of the major issues at that time   9
was how much we tolerate a rise in the contribution rate in the future.  The Ministry of Welfare and 
Labour proposed that the rate be raised to 20.0 percent in the future from the current rate of 13.85%, a 
half of which is paid by employers.  The private-sector members as well as Minister of Finance, 
Minister of Economy, Industry and Trade, and Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy 
argued that such a high contribution rate would have adverse effects on economic vitality.  After 
intense discussion on this issue, it was decided that the contribution rate would be raised to 18.3%, 
although the final decision was made by the ruling parties, based on prior discussion at the CEFP.  
While the Ministry of Welfare and Labour did not pay much attention to the impact of public pension 
system on economic vitality, most of the members of the CEFP had an economy-wide view and 
understood that too high a contribution rate would jeopardize economic vitality. 
 
(Case of mixed medical care – Another illustration) 
Another example is the so-called “mixed medical care,” which make use of both medical care not 
covered by public insurance and covered one.  Traditionally, if a patient receives both types of 
medical care, public pension does not pay an uncovered portion or a covered portion, and he or she 
has to pay all medical expenses, with a very few exceptional cases.  The patient side wanted public 
insurance to pay the covered portion in the case of “mixed medical care.”  However, practicing 
doctors and the Ministry of Welfare and Labour were strongly against that idea.  This important but 
contentious regulatory reform issue was discussed at the CEFP as well as at the Council for 
Promotion of Regulatory Reform in 2003 and 2004.  In the end, the “mixed medical care” was 
partially deregulated, and the covered portion became payable by public insurance in more cases, 
because the Prime Minister took a position of deregulating it.  In this case, leadership of the Prime 
Minister, which was facilitated by the new institutional setting, i.e., the CEFP, was the main engine of 
regulatory reform. 
 
(Next big policy reform priorities) 
In the last five years or so, the focus of economic policy was on reactive reform to overcome 
aftereffects of the bubble burst such as mounting non-performing loans.  Now that the post-bubble 
era is over, the emphasis of economic policy will be more on proactive reform to cope with medium- 
and long-term challenges ahead such as ageing of the population rather than reactive or passive 
reform. 
 
In the “Basic Policies 2006,” which was adopted by the Government this July, the following three 
priority issues in the coming decade were identified in order to pass on an affluent and secure Japan to 
future generation. 
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(i)   Enhancing growth potential and international competitiveness 
Enhancing growth potential is the basis of all economic policies.  With respect to the issue of 
population decline and the advent of an ageing society facing the Japanese economy, we must 
overcome it by developing a strategy to promote productivity improvement, technology innovation, 
and utilization of Asia’s dynamism. 
 
(ii)  Advancing fiscal consolidation 
With the aim of achieving fiscal consolidation, it is essential to draw up the “Integrated Reform of 
Expenditures and Revenues” and to make utmost efforts toward its realization.  In this process, the 
reform should take a basic stance to rectify the current structure at the earliest possible stage, and to 
make citizens feel reassured by establishing sustainable social security systems. 
 
(iii) Achieving a safe, secure, flexible and accommodating society 
There is growing public concern about the future and strong public interest in safety and security, not 
only in internal affairs but also in external relations.  There are also increasing needs for access to 
diverse options and second-chance opportunities at every life-stage.  In light of these circumstances, 
the Government will achieve a safe, secure, flexible and accommodating society by effectively using 
the fruits of economic growth. 
 
The second issue is probably easy to understand even for non-Japanese readers, since it is 
well-known that Japan’s current fiscal conditions are the worst among G-7 countries.  However, the 
first and the third ones may need some explanation.  The first issue concerns economic efficiency, 
whereas the third one has to do with equity as well as other social objectives. 
 
With China, India and other emerging economies rapidly catching up, there is a concern that Japan 
will lose its international competitiveness in many manufacturing sectors in not-so-distant future.  In 
addition, Japan’s ageing and declining population is expected to have an adverse impact on its growth 
potential.  Against this background, enhancing growth potential and international competitiveness 
by increasing labour participation, improving labour productivity and other means is perceived one of 
the most important economic policy objectives in the coming decade. 
 
There is a growing concern about widening income inequality in recent years.  Sustainability of the 
social security system is also an anxiety to many Japanese.  Crime rates have risen in recent years, 
and there is also a growing concern about natural disasters such as big earthquakes in Tokyo 
metropolitan and some other areas, because of a prolonged period of no big earthquake in those areas.  
In this sense, it is increasingly important to achieve a safe and secure society in the coming decade by   11
addressing these problems. 
 
(Remaining regulatory reform issues) 
Within the area of regulatory reform, (i) increased competition in the agricultural sector by, for 
example, entry of business corporations and (ii) reduced restriction on entry of foreign workers are 
two important remaining issues.  They are remaining since they are both very difficult issues to start 
with.  If they had been easier, they could have been resolved earlier.  There are strong vested 
interest groups in the area of agriculture to protect the status quo and their political influence is very 
powerful.  There are pros and cons regarding acceptance of more foreign workers in the Japanese 
labour market, and there is no political consensus yet among the Japanese people about this issue, 
although need for more foreign workers is becoming more and more apparent in view of declining 
and ageing population.  Anyway, the government needs to tackle more and more difficult regulatory 
reform issues now compared with, say, five years ago, against the background of economic recovery 
and stronger temptation to complacence. 
 
(Market testing) 
Within the area of regulatory reform, a full-fledged introduction of market testing is also a priority at 
the moment.  Market testing is a system whereby public services provided by the national and local 
governments are thrown open to competitive tendering between the public and private sector bidders 
under transparent, impartial and fair conditions of competition.  The contract is awarded to the 
bidder offering the best combination of price and quality. 
 
Market testing is designed to expose public services traditionally performed by civil servants to the 
discipline of competition.  Regardless of whether a contract is won by a public or private entity, 
substantial efficiency gains can be expected and public services will improve in quality, yet cost less.  
Market testing has already been implemented in such countries as Australia, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. 
 
The government is currently promoting a full-fledged introduction of this system as one means of 
improving public services.  Again, this is a very challenging task, since the public sector has 
traditionally dominated the markets concerned and enhanced competition among public and private 
organizations is required in the case of market testing, whereas more competition is required but 
restricted to the private sector in most of previous regulatory reform agendas. 
 
Line ministries tend to argue against market testing, since they will lose their jobs if contracts are won 
by private organizations.  Again, the CEFP is an appropriate mechanism to put forward market   12
testing, because its members are mostly ministers with horizontal responsibilities and representatives 
from the private sector, and none of its members has any strong incentive to argue against market 
testing. 
 
(The post-bubble era to normality) 
Now that the Japanese economy has overcome the post-bubble malaise and come back to normality, 
there is a risk that enthusiasm for economic reform will be weakened.  In the last ten years or so, the 
government and the private sector were, in a sense, forced to carry out economic reform and 
restructuring to get out of economic malaise triggered by the bubble burst at the beginning of the 
1990s.  Prime Minister Koizumi was personally very eager and committed to carry out economic 
reform.  It is really hoped that the same eagerness and enthusiasm will be sustained in the coming 
years to promote proactive reform to cope with medium- and long-term economic challenges.  Any 
complacence should be avoided. 
 
(Challenges ahead) 
Under these circumstances just mentioned above, it is imperative to maintain or even strengthen the 
function of the CEFP in economic and fiscal policy making process.  A fundamental question for us 
is how to make the CEFP function well even after the Prime Minister Koizumi retired in September 
2006.  As was mentioned earlier, an important reason for the success of the CEFP as an engine of 
structural reform was Prime Minister Koizumi’s strong personal commitment to making use of the 
CEFP as the most important institutional mechanism to foster structural reform.  We do not know yet 
whether successors will attach the same importance as Mr. Koizumi to the CEFP. 
 
Theoretically the CEFP can take up any important economic and fiscal issues and discuss them, but in 
reality what issues to be taken up depends on views of the Prime Minister, the Minister of State for 
Economic and Fiscal Policy and other leaders of the Cabinet.  LDP leaders may also play an 
important role in the selection process.  There is no automatic guarantee that the CEFP will deal with 
most of important economic and fiscal issues. 
 
One way to bind future administrations was to make decisions during the Koizumi administration on 
medium- and long-term economic and fiscal issues.  Actually, the Koizumi administration adopted 
the “Integrated Reform of Expenditures and Revenues” in July 2006, based on discussion at the CEFP.  
This medium- and long-term fiscal consolidation plan up till mid-2010s is expected to bind future 
administrations’ fiscal policy to a considerable degree. 
 
However, this is a second best approach.  A first best approach may be to make an institutional   13
arrangement in such a way that all important economic and fiscal policy issues are taken up by the 
CEFP automatically irrespective of the Prime Minister’s and other influential ministers’ views and so 
on. 